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In 1982, MI velocity unexpectedly declined at a
5-percent rate in contrast to its 3-percent average
rate ofincrease overthe previous twenty years. As a
result, the Federal Reserve de-emphasized MI in its
conduct of monetary policy, and allowed that
monetary aggregate to grow at a rapid 81/2-percent
rate for the year compared to its target range of2J/2
to 5 1 /2 percent. But even with this change in policy,
nominal income rose only moderately and real in-
come declined.
A paper in the Spring Economic Review assessed
what went "wrong" with velocity in 1982.
1 One
possibility it considered was that the public'sdemand
to hold money balances "shifted" upward in the
sense that, for given interest rates, income, and
prices, the public wanted to hold more money than
historical relationships would have predicted.
However, the article presented evidence from the
San Francisco money market model suggesting that
the demand for MI was stable, and that the decline
in velocity largely is explained by the sharp parallel
drop in short-term interest rates and inflation in
1982. In sum, the drop in interest rates raised the
quantity ofmoney demanded by the public, and the
Federal Reserve responded by allowing money to
grow faster than originally targeted. This drop in
interest rates was roughly equal in size to the sur-
prisingly sharp decline in inflation that occurred in
1982. Thus, the declines in nominal interest rates
and inflation meant that inflation-adjusted, or real,
short-term interest rates remained high and depres-
sed total spending in the economy. As aresult, GNP
grew very slowly or declined. The combination of
fast MI growth and slow income growth meant that
velocity actually fell. Thus the earlier article pre-
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sented evidence that the decline in velocity was
consistent with a stable demand for money relation-
ship, representing an increase in the quantity of
money demanded because of lower interest rates
and inflation, rather than an unstable money de-
mand function.
This analysis suggests that a good deal of the
growth in MI over 1982 and early 1983 did not have
a stimulatory effect on aggregate demand because it
represented an increase in the quantity of money
demanded, rather than an autonomous increase in
the supply of money. In other words, effective
money growth-effective in the sense ofmeasuring
the thrust of monetary policy-was lower than ac-
tual, ormeasured, money growth during the period.
We attempted to measure this effective growth by
subtracting from measured MI an estimate of the
increase in the public's demand for MI caused by
the decline in short-term interest rates that paral-
leled the decline in inflation. This estimate came
from the MI demand equation in the San Francisco
money market model. The results suggest that
whereas measured MI increased at a rapid II pcr-
cent rate over 1982/Q3-1983/QI, adjustedMI grew
at only a IJ/2 percent rate.
If the analysis behind these estimates were cor-
rect, adjusted MI should be a better indicator of
monetary policy in 1982-1983 than measured MI.
To see if this is the case, the FRBSF Research
Department's macroeconomic model (which pre-
dicts real GNP and inflation from reduced-form
equations on Ml and other variables), was simu-
lated over the period 1982/QI-1983/Q2 using ad-
justed Ml and, alternatively, actual MI. The results
ofthis experiment confirmed the above analysis of
events in 1982-83. Simulations. of velocity, real
GNP and inflation using adjusted Ml were more
accurate than those using measured MI, which
yielded large over-forecasts of all three macro-
economic variables.These results have an important policy implica-
tion. They suggest that although monetary policy
was quite restrictive in 1982, it became moderately
expansionary in 1983/QI and highly expansionary
in 1983/Q2. The money market model suggests that
the public's demand for money had fully adjustedto
the new lower levels of interest rates by the first
quarter of 1983, while money growth continued to
grow rapidly. It expanded, for example, at a fast
12 1 /2 percent rate in the second quarter of 1983.
With the adjustments in money demand over, one
could expect the growth in velocity to revert to a
more commonly observed range. Such a rebound in
velocity suggests that it would be desirable for MI
growth to slow down in the last halfof 1983. Other-
wise, there would be hefty increases in spending
which ultimately would threaten to increase the rate
ofinflation.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four
sections. Section I briefly reviews the discussion in
the earlier paper on what went''wrong" with velo-
city in 1982-83. Theestimates ofadjusted Ml growth
are presented in Section II. Section III contains a
discussion of the simulations of macroeconomic
variables. Finally, conclusions and policy implica-
tions are presented in Section IV.
I. What Went "Wrong" with Velocity in 1982-83?
One possible explanation for the unexpected
change in velocity in 1982 is that there was an
upward shift in the public's demand for money, that
is, that increasing quantities ofMI were demanded
by the public for given levels of prices, real GNP
and interest rates. This alleged shift has been attrib-
uted to a precautionary motive for holding money
caused by the economic uncertainty of the reces-
sion." This would be a plausible hypothesis if the
evidence showed that the demand for Ml did shift
upward in 1982. However, simulations of the MI-
demand equation in the San Francisco Money Mar-
ket Model' suggest that the demand for MI was
stable. The MI equation predicted annualized
growth of 10.2 percent in 1982/QI-1983/QI when
actual growth was 10.3 percent. (Ex ante forecasts
made during the year produced nearly identical
results.) Thus, the rapid Ml growth can nearly all be
"explained" by the determinants of MI demand;
these results provide no indication ofa shift in the
money demand relationship.
Ifthe demand for MI did not shift, what explains
the rapid growth of that aggregate in the period
considered? An analysis of the simulations indi-
cates that the largestcontributions were made by the
declines in the commercial paper rate in the third
and fourth quarters. These drops by themselves
caused MI to grow an annual rate of about 11.8
percent between August 1982 and February 1983,
compared to a contribution ofa 0.4 percent rate of
decline in Ml over the preceding seven months.
Apparently, most ofthe sharp increase in Ml growth
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between 1982/Q2 and 1983/QI is explained by the
drop in nominal interest rates.
Lower Inflation
Given that the demand for MI does not appear to
have shifted, an alternative explanation of the de-
cline in velocity in 1982 is required. The Federal
Reserve BankofSan Francisco staffhas argued that
the unexpectedly rapid decline in inflation provides
an explanation.
4 This explanation rests on the dis-
tinction between nominal, or market interest rates,
and real, or inflation-adjusted interest rates. The
level ofspending on goods and services depends on
the real rate of interest. In contrast, the public's
demand for Ml depends on the nominal rate of
interest. To illustrate the significance ofthis dichot-
omy for developments in 1982-83, assume that the
rate of inflation falls and that this is reflected in an
equal decline in nominal interest rates. In this cir-
cumstance, the real rate of interest would be un-
changed, implying that the decline in nominal inter-
est rates would not stimulate additional growth
in Teal GNP. However, the public's demand for
money would grow more rapidly, for a time, in
response to the drop in nominal interest rates. As a
result, money growth would accelerate in compari-
son to GNPgrowth, implying adecline in the growth
ofvelocity.
This stylized scenario is a rough approximation
to the events that occurred in 1982 as whole.) The
GNP deflator rose at an 8.9 percent rate in 1981,
then fell suddenly to a 4.4percent rate in 1982, for a
decline of4.5 percentage points in the rate ofintla-tion. The commercial paper rate fell about the same
amount, dropping 4.1 percentage points from 12.9
percent in the fourth quarterof 1981 to 8.8 percent in
the fourth quarter of 1982. The very rapid growth in
MI associated with the drop in nominal interest
rates did not stimulate the economy because real
interest rates were not reduced substantially for the
yearas a whole. Thus, real GNPoverthis periodfell
on average at a 0.9 percent rate.
II. Adjusted M1 Growth
In the midst of a decline in velocity as large as
that in 1982, growth in MI obviously would not be
a good indicator of the impact of monetary policy.
A macroeconomic model that exploits the histori-
cal relationship betweenmoney and income would
likely have over-predicted nominal income and,
thus, velocity in 1982. The analysis in the preceed-
ing section suggests a wayto correct for this prob-
lem by adjusting the growth in MI downward, and
then using the adjusted MI growth rates to predict
income on the basis ofhistorical money-to-income
relationships.
How should these MI-adjustments be calculated?
A significant part ofthe desired adjustment should
be calculated as the growth in MI caused by a drop
in nominal interest rates that paralleled the drop in
inflation. Since interest rates and inflation both de-
clined by about the same amount, we calculated the
adjustment as the MI growth due to the full drop in
interest rates in the last half of 1982. We then
subtracted these adjustments from actual MI growth
to obtain what can be called adjustedM1growth.
The figures for adjusted MI growth are presented
in Table Ion a quarterly average basis. Two aspects
of the figures are worth emphasizing. First, the
adjustments are quite large in 1982/Q3-1983/QI,
and convert rapid measured MI growth of 11.I
percent into very slow growth in adjusted MI of 1.7
percent. Second, the decline in interest rates in the
latter part of 1982 affected MI growth only tempor-
arily, specifically for three quarters. Because money
growth will rise relative to GNPgrowth only as long
as the pllblic's demand for money is stimulated by
declines in interest rates, the effects on money
growth dissipate once interest rates stabilize at new
lower levels. The exact timing depends on the lags
in the demand for money.
The MI-demand equation used suggests that
interest rates affect the public's demand for money
for about six months. According to the equation, a
one-time decline in the commercial paper rate in
any given month causes MI to accelerate relative to
GNP (that is, causes velocity growth to fall) con-
temporaneously and for the next five months. This
suggests that MI growth induced by the decline in
interest rates in 1982 should have played itself out
by the second quarterof 1983. In fact, the commer-
cial paper rate fell sharply in the third and fourth
quarters of 1982. By the second quarter of 1983,
these interest rate changes should have had only
minor effects on MI growth, and should not have
required any adjustment in that growth afterthe first
quarter. Thus this analysis suggests that the rapid
measured MI growth in the second quarter accu-
rately indicated the thrust ofpolicy in that quarter.
Table 1






























12.3III. Using Adjusted M1 in Macroeconomic Simulations
The unusual experience with inflation and veloc-
ity in 1982 and early 1983 resulted in large errors
from macroeconomic forecasting models in gen-
eral. Many models, including that of the FRBSF,
were thrown off-track, and overestimated actual
velocity, real GNP and inflation during that period.
If the above explanation for the macroeconomic
developments ofthe past year and a half were cor-
rect, adjusted MI should be a significantly more
accurate indicator of monetary policy than actual
MI. Oneway to checkthe validity ofthe MI-adjust-
ments, and therefore the underlying explanation of
events in 1982-83, is to use them in the FRBSF
Research Department's macro-model to simulate
events over the 1982~83 period.
The model is a reduced form representationofthe
U. S. economy and includes equations for real GNP
growth and inflation as functions ofM1and the high
employment deficit.
6 Velocity is not estimated di-
rectly but is obtained by subtracting (exogenous)
MI growth from the sum ofthe predicted growth in
real GNP and predicted inflation.
The model was estimated over 1966-81, and then
simulated over 1982/QI-1983/Q2 with measured
MI and, alternatively, with adjusted MI to see
which yielded results closer to the actual events of
the period. As shown in the charts below, adjusted
MI produces simulated values for inflation, real
GNPand velocity that are reasonably close to actual
developments, whereas actual MI produces large
over-forecasts.
Chart Ishows actual velocity anddynamic model
simulations with observed and adjusted MI. With
observed MI, the model follows the general pattern
of velocity from mid-1966 until 1982. The 1982-83
period is unusual in that the model substantially
overestimated velocity for a sustained period of
time. Historically, when large simulation errors
occurred, they abated within one to two quarters.
Thus, the recent errors made with actual MI are
unusual because oftheir size and because they per-
sisted so long. In contrast, the MI adjusted simula-
tions produce errors well within the range of those
experienced in the past. The same observations hold
for the real GNP and inflation simulations (not
shown). Using adjusted MI improved the model's
simulation accuracy not only for nominal GNP (and
thus velocity), but also for the split between inflation
and real GNP growth
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velocity and captures both the dramatic decline in
velocity in the second halfof 1982 and the increase
during the first halfof1983. The model still makes a
largererror in 1982/QI, but, overall, forecast errors
for the growth rate ofvelocity were reduced from an
average overforecast of 8.2 percentage points
between 1982/Q3 and 1983/Q2 with actual MI to
0.2 percentage points withadjusted Ml.
The model forecasts of real GNP considerably
overstated the strength in the economy in 1982 and
early 1983. In contrast, the simulations with adjusted
Ml tracked actual activity more closely, with the
exception of 1983/Q2 in which adjusted MI under-
estimates the strength ofthe economy. On average,
both simulations overforecasted real GNPgrowth in
the period 1982/Q3-1983/Q2. But the average fore-
cast error was only 0.2 percentage points with ad-
justed MI in contrast to 5.0 percentage points with
actual Ml. Similar observations apply to inflation.
Forecast errors were reduced from an average over-
forecast of 3.2 percentage points in the case of
simulations with actual Ml to 0.01 percentage point
with adjusted MI during 1982/Q3-1983/Q2.
Chart4















and model simulationsofvelocity, real GNPgrowth
and inflation from 1982/QI to 1983/Q2. The simu-
lated values for velocity growth in Chart 2 using
observed Ml are much higher than actual values for
the entire period. In contrast, the simulation with


























The conclusion that the behavior of velocity in
1982 may be attributed to the (surprisingly) sharp
drop in inflation and nominal interest rates has an
important implication for monetary policy in 1983.
With this explanation, there is good reason to be-
lieve that velocity will return to more commonly
observed rates ofchange in the second halfof1983.
As noted earlier, the 1982 decline in interest rates
50should affect MI growth (and thus velocity growth) 1983, followed by growth of8 percent in 1984 (the
only temporarily. Money will rise relative to GNP upper boundary of the 4 to 8 percent range tenta-
only as long as the public's demand for money is tively established for that yearby the FaMe) and 7
stimulated by declines in interest rates. Once inter- percent in 1985. The figures represent a gradual
est rates stabilize at new lower levels, the effects on reduction in MI growth in 1984-85 that is consistent
money growth should dissipate according to the with a policy of minimizing the adverse effects of
lags in the demand for money. Thus, by the second lower money growth on the economy. Our simula-
quarter of 1983, these interest rate changes should tion suggests that the rate ofinflation would be 51 h
have only minor effects on MI growth and velocity. percent in the second halfofthis year, followed by
This implies that MI growth needs to be reduced increases to 6Vz percent and 7Vz percent in 1984 and
substantially from its 12-percent rate in the second 1985 respectively. IfMI growth were held to the 7
quarterto avoid a highly expansionary effect. percent mid-pointofthe range for the second halfof
In July 1983, the Federal Reserve announced a this year, followed by growth of6 percent in 1984
revision in the 1983 target range for MI. Itreplaced and 5 percent in 1985, the inflation rate would be
the original 1983 range of 4 to 8 percent for the held to about 5 percent over the entire period.
entire yearwith a 5 to 9 percent range for the second Thus, a substantial slowdown in MI growth
halfof 1983. By establishing a second quarter base, appears to be required overthe next several years to
the Federal Reserve accommodated the rapid 12 hold the underlying rate of inflation at its present
percent growth in MI in the second quarter. If MI level. Moreover, the simulation suggests that even
were to grow at the 9 percent upper boundary ofits with this slower MI growth, aggregate demand is
new range, for example, average MI growth over likely to increase rapidly enough to sustain a recov-
the period 1983/Q1-1983/Q4 would be ten percent. ery. Velocity is estimated to grow at4 1 h percent rate
The macroeconomic model was simulated as- in the last halfof 1983 and 1984, leaving room for
suming 9 percent MI growth in the second half of real GNP to grow at a 51 /2 percent rate
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